Boring Facts about Democracy

A brief follow-up after the previous post about democracy. These facts are expected and, thus, boring, but they are numbers, and only numbers show the seriousness of what the world is talking about in words.

The data comes from the same World Values Survey (WVS). The questions of interest:

  • people’s democratic values (1 — democracy is very good; 4 — very bad),
  • their autocratic values, when they appreciate “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” (1 — autocracy is very good, 4 — very bad),
  • the state of democracy as perceived by respondents in respective countries (1 — non-democratic country; 10 — democratic one).

Autocracy–Democracy Frontier

Preferences for strong leaders and democratic governance correlate. Some countries prefer both democracy and strong leaders that ignore democratic institutions:

democ_autoc_prefs
(Egypt was excluded from the regression.)

Democratizations haven’t changed political values

According to the WVS, the worldwide (mean) political values haven’t changed much over the recent two decades, despite the world becoming more democratic after 1991:

democ_autoc_dyn

Democracy remains a value in unstable times

The sample below includes a country if the WVS conducted surveys before and after interesting changes happened in that country. Keep in mind that a higher value on these scales corresponds to a lower opinion of the respective idea:

democ_autoc_dyn_12Egypt values the idea of a strong leader more after the Arab Spring—they had pretty tough times there. Iraqi people react in a similar way. Instability associated with the onset of democracy creates demand for strong leaders, but after all, no country in this sample values democracy less.

People defend their values

Do countries successfully reach the government system their populations prefer? At first sight, they don’t:

democ_pref_fact

If nations could establish democracy when they liked it, the red line would have a negative slope. In fact, a subset of countries on the right has a negative slope. It’s the Philippines and Arab countries that make the main line horizontal. But this data was collected basically during the Arab Spring, and it doesn’t account for all the changes.

Anyway, this chart is interesting since we should expect discontent in the south-west quadrant—and discontent is there.

Democracy and Struggle for Definition

Common definitions happen to be useful in research. Instead of arguing what “democracy” means, economists agree on the same definition and move on to important things, for example, the relationships between democracy and economic growth:

Acemoglu et al., "Democracy Does Cause Growth."
Acemoglu et al., “Democracy Does Cause Growth.”

So, you study relationships between specific “democracy” (usually Polity IV) and specific “growth” (real GDP per capita). No problem in studying another democracy and another growth. But until economists conquer the world and turn everyone into an economist, very few heads are working on the issue right now. And these heads have to focus on very specific definitions, like the Polity IV components of “democracy”:

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment
Openness of Executive Recruitment
Constraint on Chief Executive
Competitiveness of Political Participation

This makes communication with the public difficult, though. For one reason, the public understands “democracy” differently. The great source for making a representative public definition of “democracy” is the World Values Survey (WVS). The survey reaches thousands of respondents in 52 countries, and since 1995, asks questions about democracy. Specifically, it asks to “tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy,” and offers nine scales. Summary stats of these scales (min 1 — not an essential characteristic; max 10 — an essential characteristic):

Definition of democracy given by the WVS respondents
Definition of democracy given by the WVS respondents

The first row is the answer to the question how good democracy is for the respondent’s political system (min 1 — “Very good”; max 4 — “Very bad”). The rest of the variables are the components of democracy as defined by 74,000 people from 52 countries. You can think of the respective means (third column) as weights each variable has in the public definition of democracy. The standard deviations aren’t huge, which implies some consensus across many people.

These components seemingly have little in common with the Polity IV’s definition. To make sure, let’s compare the Polity IV index of political regimes with question V141 from the WVS, which asks “how democratically is this country being governed today.” A scale ‘from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic.”’ Hence, I compare two things: the respondent’s opinion about the state of democracy (as she understands the concept) in her country and Polity IV’s expert’s opinion about the state of democracy (as defined by Polity IV) in the same country.

Democracies described by the public in the WVS and by experts in the Polity IV dataset have almost nothing in common:

democ_wvs_p4

Though the regression line is not horizontal and the relationship is significant at 0.01, R² is just 14%. Not what you may expect from two things with the same name.

This nerdy fact is important because results in the social sciences are relevant only for concepts as they’ve been defined in the social sciences. If your definition X is different from my definition X, then my investigations of X are useless to you. If someone thinks that “democracy” is when “the army takes over when government is incompetent” (row six in the table) then this democracy does not cause economic growth that the first figure shows. In fact, the authors of the figure describe in detail how they constructed the measure of democracy that is relevant for growth.

Of course, when it comes to elections and policy making, economists become as humble as dentists. That is, not even dentists, but also physicians know how to fix the economy—contrary to what economists think on the same matter. In addition, there’s no organized communication between people and researchers. When the public is so poorly informed about actual research, the difference in definitions—of which “democracy” is just one example—seem unimportant. It is, to an extent. But whenever serious research makes it into the media, it’s better to doublecheck the words.

How Competition Destroys Confidence

I’ve been wondering why Gallup excludes science and academia from the list of institutions Americans can be confident in. The firm runs that poll since 1973 and had 40 years to ask. Maybe it didn’t because academia itself is far from being influential. Anyway, there’re other poll, with scientists mentioned:

Source
PEW
Source
PEW

A bigger puzzle is, why do these exact institutions earn so much confidence?

Source
Source

After all, the military have lots of secrets, the clergy is not accountable, the medical system charges a four-digit bill for dealing with a cold. What happens on the other end? The President and Congress, which are elected by people. The media—they’re open, you can check them.

Any versions? Well, the military, police, church, supreme court are monopolies. In contrast, the President, Congress, and the media furiously compete (often with each other). In 80 years, you can live through ten presidents and visit the same church every Sunday. You have ten local newspapers, but one police department.

Openness creates opportunities for information disclosure. Illustratively, competition between Obama and Republicans reveals lots of details. These blame games, which are impossible in hierarchical and secretive monopolies, reveal facts biased against the other side. And negative information is more powerful than good stories. As Warren Buffett said, “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.”

This competition creates confusion and distrust, but it also gives a chance to compare different opinions and understand who does better. Public institutions holding a monopoly grant no chances. So, they seem to be fine. If they say that the Earth is squared, then it’s squared—who would question this obvious fact?

Solving Big Problems by Breaking Them Into Smaller Ones

As Gallup reports, Americans worry most about economic issues:

C9CE08B8-C1E4-4C82-9AF8-938B14AA342B
Gallup

That’s puzzling because the United States did best, compared to other developed countries, in recovering from the crisis:

CEA
CEA

David Wessel from Brookings suggests why this achievement isn’t encouraging and “economy in general” is still a concern. Now, look at developing countries:

PEW Research
PEW Research

These problems are more specific, partly because PEW’s questions are closed and Gallup’s are open-ended. Crime, health care, pollution, for example, appear in both polls. But it’s less evident that they’re important problems in the United States, too. The number of homicides is comparable to that of developing countries. K-12 education doesn’t catch up developed countries in international rankings. Or the results of the War on Poverty:

CEA
CEA

(The poor actually do slightly better because the measure excludes social transfers. Still, transfers are supposed to be a temporary relief when families fall below the poverty level. Instead, social mobility is low and the poverty is persistent among many specific families.)

Dissatisfaction with government and economy is a big, unsolvable complaint. But breaking big dissatisfaction into smaller problems helps recognize crimes, education, and poverty, which the government can solve. What does it takes? Usually, smarter, not necessarily expensive, policies. And it’s not like no one knows how to do better in this complex world (thousands of academic papers offer very feasible changes for better), but it seems too few want it after all got confused by big hopeless problems.